Discrimination emerging through spontaneous symmetry breaking in a
  spatial prisoner's dilemma model with multiple labels by Jensen, Gorm Gruner et al.
Discrimination emerging through spontaneous symmetry breaking in a spatial
prisoner’s dilemma model with multiple labels
Gorm Gruner Jensen,∗ Frederik Tischel, and Stefan Bornholdt
Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of Bremen, 28359 Bremen, Germany
(Dated: June 19, 2019)
Social discrimination seems to be a persistent phenomenon in many cultures. It is important to
understand the mechanisms that lead people to judge others by the group to which they belong,
rather than individual qualities. It was recently shown that evolutionary (imitation) dynamics can
lead to a hierarchical discrimination between agents marked with observable, but otherwise mean-
ingless, labels. These findings suggest that it can give useful insight, to describe the phenomenon of
social discrimination in terms of spontaneous symmetry breaking. The investigations so far have,
however, only considered binary labels. In this contribution we extend the investigations to models
with up to seven different labels. We find the features known from the binary label model remain
remarkably robust when the number of labels is increased. We also discover a new feature, namely
that it is more likely for neighbours to have strategies which are similar, in the sense that they agree
on how to act towards a subset of the labels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination is often defined as treating individuals
differently because of the groups to which they belong
rather than individual traits (or qualities). Most of the
empirically observed discrimination can be explained by
ingroup favouritism [1, 2]. That is, people tend to act in
favour of those who are similar to themselves at the ex-
pense of those who are different. An increasing body of
research, however, is suggesting that discrimination can-
not be explained by ingroup favouritism alone. A num-
ber of experiments have shown, that many inter-group
relations are asymmetric in the sense that members of
one of the groups show much less, some times even nega-
tive, ingroup favouritism than members of the other [3–
8]. These findings seem to indicate that there exists a
sort of hierarchy of social status between different groups.
In this paper we will explore a minimalistic evolutionary
game theory model in which persistent hierarchical dis-
crimination can emerge through spontaneous symmetry
breaking.
Most of the evolutionary game theory literature has
been a search for mechanisms which promote cooper-
ative behaviour through evolutionary dynamics [9, 10].
One mechanisms which have been thoroughly studied is
the so called tag-based cooperation [11–17]. This is of
special interest to us, because the introduction of ob-
servable tags makes it possible to define discrimination
in a very simple way. One can say that an agent’s be-
haviour – or strategy – is discriminating if it is different
towards peers who have different tags but identical be-
haviours. Most of the models of tag-based cooperation
are, however, not directly applicable for describing per-
sistent hierarchical discrimination. Some papers have al-
ready been very explicit about the close relation between
tag-based cooperation and ingroup favouritism [17, 18].
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Also, the behaviour of the tag-based cooperation mod-
els tends to express cyclic or wave-like dynamics, with a
constant renewal of the dominating tags and strategies
known as the ‘chromodynamics of cooperation’ [13].
Recently, it was demonstrated that persistent hierar-
chical discrimination can emerge if the evolutionary dy-
namics only works on strategies, but not on the labels
[19]. By starting from a spatially extended system – an-
other well know mechanism for promoting cooperation
[20–22] – it was shown that under high selection pres-
sure the cooperation would partially fail in a way which
breaks the symmetry between two groups of agents dis-
tinguished only by an otherwise meaningless label. It was
shown that the proposed dynamics consistently leads to
a state where, dependent on parameters, either the mi-
nority or the majority is systematically favoured. Hu-
man societies, however, consist of more than two types
of people. Humans can for example have many different
religions, countries or origin, eye colours, and so on. It
is, therefore, natural to ask whether the same mechanism
can also lead to discrimination if there are more than two
different labels in the system.
In this paper we will examine an extension of the hier-
archical discrimination model [19] with up to seven dif-
ferent labels. This leads to a richer set of possible model
outcomes, as the number of competing strategies grows
exponentially with the number of labels. We will show
that much of the original structure is preserved, in par-
ticular that the number of labels have almost no impact
on the parameter regions dominated by unconditional co-
operation or defection. This is a remarkable result con-
sidering that the fraction of non-discriminating strategies
decreases exponentially.
II. MODEL
Consider a population of N agents occupying the nodes
of a graph. The graph edges represent an agent’s neigh-
bourhood. Agents interact with their neighbours in a
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2prisoner’s dilemma type game where they can either co-
operate or defect. Each agent has one of L distinct labels
which can be observed by its neighbours. The label is
the only observable difference between agents. An agent
may therefore discriminate by cooperating with those
neighbours who carry some of the labels while defect-
ing against those carrying others. A strategy specifies
whether to cooperate with or defect against neighbours
with each of the L labels. There are 2L different possi-
ble strategies since a strategy can be represented by one
binary variable for each label.
Cooperation costs an amount c for the donating agent
and gives a benefit b to the receiver. The payoff of an
agent is calculated as the sum of the benefits the agent
receives, minus the sum of the costs the agent pays:
pi =
∑
j∈Ni
b · Cj(λi)− c · Ci(λj) (1)
where Ni is the set of neighbours of agent i, λi ∈
{1, ..., L} is the label of agent i, and Ci(λj) = 1 if it
is the strategy of agent i is to cooperate with the label
of agent j and Ci(λj) = 0 if it is to defect. It should be
noted that the payoff is a simple function of the state –
the labels and strategies of the agent and its neighbours
– and that it is not accumulated over time.
The dynamical variables in our model are the agents’
strategies. These change according to the following rule:
First we choose a random agent with uniform probability
whose strategy will be updated. With a small probabil-
ity µ the agent will “mutate”, i.e. choose a new strategy
at random with uniform probability distribution. Most
of the times, with probability 1 − µ, the selected agent
will copy the strategy of one of its neighbours. That
neighbour is chosen with a probability proportional to
its ‘fitness’. The fitness of agent i, fi, is related to its
payoff pi via the expression fi = exp(w · pi). Here, w is
a global parameter which we will refer to as the selec-
tion pressure. When the selection pressure is very small,
w → 0, it is almost equally likely to choose any neighbour
independent of their payoff. When the selection pressure
is large, w → ∞, the neighbour with the largest payoff
will almost certainly be chosen.
Notice that when an agent chooses a new strategy it is
indifferent to how the strategy matches with the labels.
For example, there is nothing to hinder that an agent
with a blue label copies a strategy from a neighbour with
a green label which dictates only to cooperate with green
neighbours.
In the case where there are L = 2 different labels, our
model is the same as that studied in [19]. In the case
where there is only L = 1 type of agents, it is a slight
variation of a model presented in 2005 by Ohtsuki et al.
[21], designed to demonstrate that evolutionary dynamics
can promote cooperation in systems with spatial struc-
ture. Our model varies from the one proposed by Ohtsuki
et al. by using the exponential function (f = exp(w · p))
in the relation between fitness and payoff, rather than an
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FIG. 1. Left: Time-series of the strategy proportion for
squared lattices with periodic boundary conditions, 10000
agents and 3 labels for different benefits b and selection pres-
sures w with constant cost c = 1 and constant mutation rate
µ = 0.001. Starting with anyone having the strategy to not
cooperate. Right: Snapshots of the strategy distributions
corresponding to the end of the time-series. The chosen val-
ues of b and w correspond to the different phases shown in
phase diagram in figure 2.
affine function (f = 1−w+wp). The two functions con-
verge in the limit of vanishing selection pressure (w → 0).
III. RESULTS
The main results presented in this paper are all ob-
tained from a system with 100×100 agents arranged in a
regular square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
The labels are randomly assigned to each agent with in-
dependent uniform probability. To reduce the number of
parameters we have used a small constant mutation rate
of µ = 0.001. The non-zero mutation rate prevents the
system from getting stuck in absorbing single-strategy
fixed-points. One benefit of this is that we can start ev-
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FIG. 2. Results for squared lattices with periodic boundary conditions, 10000 agents and 3 labels, a constant mutation rate
µ = 0.001 and a constant cost c = 1. Left: phase diagram showing the most dominating strategy class over selection pressure
w and benefit b after 1.25 × 108 time steps, the marks A-E correspond to the results shown in figure 1. Middle: Parameter
scans showing strategy class proportion over selection pressure w for fixed cooperation benefit b, correspond to the horizontal
lines in the phase diagram. Right: Parameter scans showing strategy class proportion over cooperation benefit b for fixed
selection pressure w, correspond to the vertical lines in the phase diagram.
ery simulation in the simplest strategy-configuration in
which no agent cooperates with anyone. We have also ex-
plored the model with agents arranged in both random
regular graphs and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs. These results
are collected in section A of the supplementary material
for comparison.
A. Three labels
To build an understanding of how our model behaves,
we start by presenting five examples of typical dynam-
ics arising when agents are arranged in a square lattice
and the number of distinct labels is L = 3 (see figure 1).
These examples illustrate the variety of behaviours ob-
served at different values of cooperation benefit b and
selection pressure w. Each example consists of two sub-
figures: One time-series of the fraction of the population
following each of the eight possible strategies, and one
snapshot showing how the strategies are distributed on
the lattice at the end of the time-series. Because of the
non-zero mutation rate it is impossible for the model to
have any fixed-points, but the time-series clearly indi-
cate that the systems tend to reach a meta-stable state
in which the fractions of strategies fluctuates with small
variations around some constant value. In the four ex-
amples A–D the stationary distributions are clearly dom-
inated by a single strategy. We find that this is a gen-
eral result as long as the selection-pressure w is small
(w . 0.2). This is reminiscent of the absorbing states in
the voter model [23, 24]. When the selection-pressure is
large, such as in example E, the situation is more compli-
cated and requires a more careful analysis which we will
return to later.
Each simulation was initiated with the strategy con-
figuration in which all agents are ‘not cooperating with
anyone’. The parameters chosen for each of the five ex-
amples are marked in the phase diagram in figure 2.
A: Our first example has a low cooperation benefit b =
2 and intermediate selection pressure w = 0.1. At these
parameters, the system stays dominated by the strategy
C(none) (not cooperating with anyone).
B: With a slightly higher cooperation benefit b = 3,
the system ends up with a majority of agents who coop-
erate with one of the 3 labels. In our example it is the
agents with blue labels who receive the positive treatment
by almost everyone, but since the labels are symmetri-
cally defined, the dominant strategy could just as well
have been only cooperating with red or with green. We
call these the C(1) strategies, because they single out one
of the labels as the only receiver of cooperation. Looking
at the time-series we see that all 3 C(1) strategies are ini-
tially expanding by out-competing the C(none) strategy.
However, when there are no more complete defectors to
displace one of the C(1) strategies ends up suppressing
the others and eventually dominates the entire popula-
tion.
C: The dynamics at high cooperation benefit, b = 8,
are very similar to those described in example (B), except
that here it is the C(2) strategies which are dominating
the system. These are the strategies which cooperate
with two of the label, e.g. cooperate with red and blue
neighbours, but not those with green labels. Again we
see that the system ends up being dominated by just
410 2 10 1 100
w
0
2
4
6
8
10
b
4 labels
10 2 10 1 100
w
5 labels
10 2 10 1 100
w
6 labels
C(none) C(1) C(2) C(3) C(4) C(5) C(6) C(all)
10 2 10 1 100
w
7 labels
FIG. 3. Phase diagrams showing the most common strategy types for squared lattices with periodic boundary conditions,
10000 agents and up to 7 labels over selection pressure w and benefit b with constant cost c = 1 and constant mutation rate
µ = 0.001. (2.5× 108 time steps for every data point)
one of these strategies. It is worth noting that in the
very early rounds, while most of the agents still have the
strategy not to cooperate with anyone, there is a brief
rise of agents cooperating with everyone, C(all).
D: If, compared to example (C), the selection pressure
is a little smaller, w = 0.06, then the balance switches
between the strategies C(2) and C(all). Here the system
ends up in a state where the large majority of agents are
cooperating with all of their neighbours, independently
of their label.
E: If, however, the selection pressure is increased to
a high value, w = 1, the system fractures into mix of
all strategies of strategy classes 1 and 2, with strategy
class 1 being more dominant. Interestingly it is the C(2)
strategies which first very quickly displace the initial de-
fectors, but in the long run they are suppressed by the
C(1) strategies.
The left panel of figure 2 is a phase diagram showing
which strategy class is the most dominating as a func-
tion the cooperation benefit b and the selection pressure
w. One can clearly distinguish four of the five phases ex-
emplified in figure 1. While the distinction between (B)
and (E) were clear in the examples, it cannot be seen by
looking at this measure alone.
The two panels in the middle show parameter scans
made at fixed cooperation benefits, b = 8.0 and b = 2.0
respectively, as indicated by the horizontal lines in the
phase diagram. These show what fractions of the popu-
lation belong to each strategy class as a function of the
selection pressure w. At b = 8 we observe two transi-
tions between different phases: One is a sharp transition
at w ≈ 0.05 from the phase where everyone cooperates
with everyone else to the phase where almost all agents
has a strategy of class 2. The other is a smooth transi-
tion at w ≈ 0.15 to the state where strategy class 1 and
2 coexist with class 1 being more common. For b = 2 we
see just one sharp transition from the phase where nearly
nobody cooperates with anyone to a phase strongly dom-
inated by strategy class 1.
The two panels on the right show parameter scans sim-
ilar to those in the middle, but with varying coopera-
tion benefit b and fixed selection pressures, w = 0.1 and
w = 1.0, as marked by the vertical lines in the phase dia-
gram. At w = 0.1 we observe three different phases sep-
arated by two sharp transition. The transition between
almost no cooperation and the phase dominated by strat-
egy class 1 happens at b ≈ 2.8. The phases dominated
by strategy classes 1 and 2, respectively, are separated
by a transition at b ≈ 4.5 which is almost as sharp. At
w = 1.0 there is a sharp transition at b ≈ 1.3 between
the phase with almost no cooperation to one where al-
most all agents have a strategy from class 1. When the
cooperation benefit b is increased above this transition,
we observe a smooth change where an increasing fraction
of the agents ends up with strategies from class 2, result-
ing in the ‘mixed phase’ as illustrated by example E in
figure 1.
Based on these observations we can say that for a pop-
ulation with 3 different labels and agents arranged on a
squared lattice there are sharp transitions between the
phases represented by the examples A-D in figure 1 and
smooth transition from B to E and from C to E.
B. More labels
To learn how the model behaves in systems with L > 3
labels, figure 3 shows parameter scans for systems with
up to 7 different labels. The plots show the most com-
mon strategy class as a function of cooperation benefit
b and selection pressure w. We see that the regions of
parameter space in which the system is dominated by
unconditional cooperation or defection are almost un-
affected when changing the number of labels. As we
increase the number of labels, the number of strategy
classes goes up as well. Consequently, the discriminating
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FIG. 4. Results for squared lattices with periodic boundary
conditions, 10000 agents and 3 labels, a constant mutation
rate µ = 0.001 and a constant cost c = 1 after 108 time steps.
A: 2D parameter scan showing the most common strategy
class over benefit b and selection pressure w for connectiv-
ity k = 4, 8 and 12. B: Parameter scans showing the most
common strategy class over selection pressure w and connec-
tivity k for benefit b = 2k. C: Strategy class proportion and
the boundary probability of linked agents sharing the same
strategy over the number of neighbours k for benefit b = 2k
and selection pressure w = 1. D: Strategy distributions for
connectivity k = 4, 8 and 12, benefit b = 2k and selection
pressure w = 1.
parameter region is subdivided into an increasing num-
ber of sub-regions, characterised by which strategy-class
ends up dominating the system. This division follows a
very simple structure. Nearest to the region dominated
by unconditional defection, the system will be dominated
by a strategy which cooperates with one of the labels (e.g.
cooperate only with blue). When going a little further,
the dominating strategies are those who cooperate with
two of the labels (e.g. cooperate with blue and green, but
not with the rest), and so on. Nearest to the region of
unconditional cooperation we find the system dominated
by strategies which discriminate negatively against a sin-
gle label (e.g. cooperate with all neighbours except the
blue).
The phase diagrams in figure 3 only show which strat-
egy class ends up as the most abundant at a given
parameter-set. Therefore it hides the finer structures,
such as whether the system ends up being dominated
by a single representative of the strategy class, or if the
stationary state is a mixture of many strategies as, for
example, in example E in figure 1. In the L = 3 case,
one can get a good sense of this transition by looking at
the 1D parameter scans shown in figure 2 and paying at-
tention to how big a fraction of the agents follow the most
abundant strategy-class. Similar figures, but with up to
L = 7 different labels can be found in the supplemen-
tary material. They indicate that the parameter-region
characterised by fractured coexistence (such similar to
example E) doesn’t depend on the number of labels.
In summary, the phase-diagram capturing the model’s
long-term behaviour seems to be remarkably independent
of the number of labels.
C. Further analysis
The results presented so far have all been limited to the
case where agents have 4 neighbours. In this next sec-
tion we will characterise how the system changes when
we change the connectivity. Figure 4 shows simulation
results from systems with 3 labels and agents arranged
in grids with 3 labels and up to 12 neighbours. Interested
readers can find a detailed description of the lattice struc-
tures in the supplementary material section B.
Panel (A) shows 3 phase diagrams – similar to those
presented in the previous figures – with 4, 8 and 12 neigh-
bours respectively. It can be seen that the cooperation
benefit b have to be kept proportional to the connectivity
k to get similar results. This was expected based on the
results from Ohtsuki et al. [21] who said that cooperation
occurs, if benefit to cost ratio exceeds the connectivity.
It can also be seen that the system’s stationary state is
almost independent of cooperation benefits, when this is
above ∼ 2k (marked by the horizontal lines). This means
that when the cooperation benefit is high, the transition
point between phases of unconditional cooperation and
discrimination is almost only controlled by the selection
pressure and the connectivity. It is clear to see, that
when the connectivity i higher, the transition into a dis-
criminating phase happens at lower selection pressure. A
more detailed visualisation of this can be seen in panel
(B). Here we compare parameter scans at varying the se-
lection pressure w for connectivities ranging from k = 3
to k = 12 and fixed cooperation benefit b = 2k. It can
6be seen how reduction of the selection pressure needed to
increase discrimination has a slightly convex course.
Panel (C) gives some more detail about how the strat-
egy distribution depends on connectivity at k when both
the selection pressure and cooperation benefit are high
(w = 1 and b = 2k). The round dots show what fraction
of the population ends up in each strategy class, as mea-
sured on the left axis. It can be seen that when the con-
nectivity is higher, the gap between the strategy classes
1 and 2 becomes bigger. When k & 10, almost all agents
end up with a C(1) strategy, even though all other pa-
rameters are the same as in example E in figure 1 where
the stationary distribution was a disorderly mixture of
small patches with different strategies. To further quan-
tify this difference, the red crosses show the fraction of
neighbours who have different strategies (boundary frac-
tion). This is measured as the number of links connecting
agents with different strategies, divided by the total num-
ber of links. The ‘boundary fraction’ is a lot smaller when
the connectivity is higher, as the system goes towards a
state dominated by a single strategy. This indicates that
increasing the connectivity pushes the smooth transition
between the phases represented by example E and B in
figure 2 towards higher selection pressure. To give a more
intuitive visualisation of this difference, panel (D) shows
three snapshots of how the stationary strategy distribu-
tion look for three different connectivities – k = 4, k = 8
and k = 12 respectively.
It is not immediately obvious, but a careful study of
snapshots like the one in figure 4 with connectivity k = 4
or example E in figure 1 reveals an interesting pattern in
how frequently different strategies occupy neighbouring
nodes. Patches of a C(2) strategy – which cooperating
with two of the labels – are less likely to be found next to
patches of the C(1) strategy which cooperates with the
third label than next to the two other C(1) strategies.
E.g. yellow patches (cooperate with green and red) share,
on average, more border with the green or red patches
than with the blue. In order to quantify this observa-
tion we can draw graphs like the one in figure 5, where
each node represents one of the discriminating strate-
gies, and the thickness of the link between two nodes is
proportional to the number of neighbour-pairs with one
neighbour following each of the corresponding strategies
(on average over an ensemble of individual simulations).
The result varies with the choice of parameters. Here
we have chosen to emphasise an example at cooperation
benefit b = 8 and selection pressure w = 10−0.54. This
point is near the transition between the phases domi-
nated by C(1) and C(2) strategies, so all the discrim-
inating strategies are approximately equally abundant.
We have chosen not to include the unconditional strate-
gies, since they are almost non-existent at these param-
eters. We have also chosen not to visualise the self-links,
because these would be many times stronger than the
links between different strategies. The figure shows that
strategies are more likely to occupy neighbouring when
they agree on how to behave towards more of the labels.
C(r)
C(r,g)
C(g)
C(g,b)
C(b)
C(r,b)
FIG. 5. Left panel: Graphs representation visualising the
strategy distributions. Each node represents one of the dis-
criminating strategies. The thickness of a link between two
nodes is proportional to the fraction of neighbour-pairs with
one agent following each of the corresponding strategies after
108 timesteps averaged over 100 simulations with the follow-
ing parameters: Each agent is connected to the k = 4 nearest
neighbours in a 100×100 square lattice, and has one of L = 3
possible labels chosen independently with uniform probabil-
ity. We used cooperating benefit b = 8, selection pressure
w = 10−0.54, and mutation rate µ = 0.001, and we initi-
ated all simulations with all agents following the ‘defect all’
strategy. Right panel: Example of one of the 100 datapoints
combined to make the graph.
A handful of other examples are included in the supple-
mentary material section C. These show that the result
is qualitatively robust at for a wide range of parame-
ters near the transition between phases where different
strategy-classes coexist, except for very low values of se-
lection pressure where the signal drowns in noise.
While all the results presented in the so far have been
obtained from systems where the agents are arranged
in regular lattices, it is straightforward to apply our
model to other topologies. In the supplementary ma-
terial section A we have included figures showing how
the model behaves on both random regular graphs and
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (binomial) random graphs. The main re-
sults are very similar to those obtained on regular graphs,
but there are a few differences worth mentioning. One
difference is, that without the low-dimensional spatial
grid structure, the model has an even stronger tendency
to end with almost all agents applying the same strategy.
This results in some expanded bistable parameter regions
around the transitions between the different phases. In
these regimes, the systems will end up being dominated
by one single strategy, but it is unpredictable from which
strategy class. Another difference is caused by the varia-
tion of connectivities in the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs. Agents
with more neighbours can potentially end up with higher
payoffs. Since the model has a non-linear tendency to
select ‘the richest’ neighbours, the dynamics tend to be-
ing dominated by the local structures around highly con-
nected agents. This can lead to scattered strategy dis-
tributions when the selection pressure is high, w & 0.1
7.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have studied a spatial prisoner’s
dilemma model in which agents marked with meaning-
less labels imitate the strategies of their neighbours –
preferably the richest ones. It is a well know result dis-
covered by Ohtsuki et al. [21], that in the special case
with only L = 1 label, i.e. when all agents are identical,
cooperation is the evolutionarily stable strategy when the
cooperation benefit is greater than the average connec-
tivity, i.e. b > k. Our simulations confirm that this
simple rule also applies to systems with a multitude of
different labels, as long as the selection pressure is suffi-
ciently low. We have also confirmed that states of per-
sistent hierarchical discrimination can emerge through
spontaneous symmetry breaking, which was previously
only demonstrated in the case of binary labels (L = 2)
[19]. We have investigated systems with up to L = 7
different labels, and we found that the transition points
between unconditional and discriminating strategies are
essentially independent of the number of labels. This
quantitative robustness is interesting when considering
that the two unconditional strategies (cooperate/defect
against all) constitute a rapidly decreasing fraction of the
number of possible strategies, which increases exponen-
tially with the number of labels.
While the main results known from the cases with L =
1 and L = 2 are essentially unchanged in systems with
L > 2, our investigations have also revealed some new
phenomena. One finding is that the parameter-region
dominated by discriminating strategies is subdivided into
distinct phases dominated by different strategy-classes.
While one cannot know from the onset of a simulation
which strategies are going to dominate in the system, it
is possible to make reliable predictions about how many
of the labels these strategies treat with cooperation and
defection. This is similar to two discriminating phases
“cooperate with the majority” and “cooperate with the
minority” which were detected in the binary-label model.
Another fascinating phenomenon which can only be
observed when L > 2 is that neighbours are more likely to
have similar strategies. Since strategies are copied from
neighbour to neighbour, it is no surprise that the model
forms patches of agents agreeing on a single strategy.
There are, however, no mechanisms in our model which
explicitly favour neighbours with similar strategies. It
is therefore surprising to observe that it is more likely
for neighbours to have more similar strategies, when we
measure similarity between two strategies as the number
of label towards which they agree on what action to take.
We do not yet understand this observation and finding
an explanation will require further research.
The model described in this paper is not the only one
in the literature of evolutionary game theory which is de-
signed to investigate the combined effect of spatial struc-
ture and distinguishable agents. One example is the work
by Garcia et al. [15] who demonstrated that introducing
tags may reduce the amount of cooperation in a struc-
tured population through a mechanism they have called
“the evil green-beard effect”. The outcome that intro-
ducing tags can lower the total amount of cooperation
through negative discrimination is also present in the
model presented in this paper, yet the dynamics lead-
ing to this effect is quite different. Our model tends to
end up in in a stationary state, whereas theirs exhibits
cyclic behaviour which is characteristic for tag-based co-
operation [11–16, 18]. One of the main differences is that
the models of tag-based cooperation treat the tags as a
part of the variable state subject to the evolution dy-
namics. Our labels, on the other hand, are immutable
properties of the agents, determined at the beginning of
the simulation. This can be seen as an approximation
of a system in which behaviours adapt on a much faster
timescale than physical appearances as, for example, if
the dynamics are thought of as a type of learning via so-
cial imitation, while the labels represent genetically de-
termined physical traits. This is reminiscent of the close
connection between multi-agent reinforcement learning
and evolutionary dynamics [25, 26]. Another important
assumption in our model is that agents choose which of
their neighbours to imitate solely based on their fitness.
In particular it doesn’t consider the labels – neither its
own nor those of the neighbours – or how they interact
with the imitated strategy. This can be interpreted as if
the agents are not aware of their own labels. It is difficult
to imagine, that humans should carry easily observable
markers without being aware of them themselves. Our
softer interpretation is that the strategies represent sub-
conscious biases exempted from rational reasoning. Ex-
perimental evidence suggesting that humans do exhibit
ingroup devaluation (or outgroup favouritism) [4, 5, 7]
supports this viewpoint and finds a possible representa-
tion in the model.
In conclusion, the model we investigated in this paper
demonstrates that imitating successful behaviours may
lead to the emergence of persistent hierarchical discrim-
ination in a population where agents are marked with
observable, but otherwise meaningless, labels. We found
this to be a remarkably robust phenomenon with respect
to the number of labels. A central mechanism of the
emergence of hierarchical social structures in the model
is spontaneous symmetry breaking, transforming initial
randomness into persistent fates.
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SUPPLEMENT A: RANDOM GRAPHS
All the figures presented in the main text are based on systems where agents are arranged in regular 2D-lattices.
To investigate to what extend the results depend on this topology, we have reproduced some of the results using both
random regular graphs and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs.
When we use random regular graphs we generally find a very similar results to those obtained on regular lattices.
However, there is one difference worth pointing out. Since the random regular graph has very small diameter and
cluster-coefficient, it is not possible to form ‘patches’ in the same way as on a 2D lattice. As a result the entire system
is even more likely to end up being dominated by a single strategy. The amplification of the ‘winner takes all’ dynamics
also makes it less predictable to which strategy-class the winning strategy belongs, as an early victory becomes more
important. Therefore, the system expresses more bistable behaviour at the parameters near the transitions between
the different phases.
On Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs the results are in addition a lot more fuzzy at high selection pressures w & 0.1. An agent
with higher connectivity has the potential to get a higher profit and consequently much higher fitness. Because of
this, the model is not very robust to local variations in connectivity.
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FIG. A1. Phase diagrams showing the most common strategy type for Random Regular Graphs(top) with connectivity 4 and
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graph(bottom) with avg connectivity 4, 10000 agents and up to 7 labels over selection pressure w and
benefit b with constant cost c = 1 and constant mutation rate µ = 0.001. (2.5×108 timesteps for every data point). Essentially
the same as figure 3, but using different topologies.
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FIG. A2. Parameter scans showing strategy class proportion over selection pressure w for Square Lattices(grid), Random
Regular Graphs(RR) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graphs(ER) with fixed benefit b=2 and up to 7 labels. (2.5 × 108 timesteps
for every data point)
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FIG. A3. Parameter scans showing strategy class proportion over selection pressure w for Square Lattices(grid), Random
Regular Graphs(RR) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graphs(ER) with fixed benefit b=8 and up to 7 labels. (2.5 × 108 timesteps
for every data point)
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FIG. A4. Parameter scans showing strategy class proportion over benefit b for Square Lattices(grid), Random Regular
Graphs(RR) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graphs(ER) with fixed selection pressure w=0.1 and up to 7 labels. (2.5×108 timesteps
for every data point)
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FIG. A5. Parameter scans showing strategy class proportion over benefit b for Square Lattices(grid), Random Regular
Graphs(RR) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graphs(ER) with fixed selection pressure w=1.0 and up to 7 labels. (2.5×108 timesteps
for every data point)
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FIG. A6. Results for Random Regular Graphs(left) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graphs(right), with 10000 agents and 3 labels,
a constant mutation rate µ = 0.001 and a constant cost c = 1 after 108 time steps.A: 2D parameter scan showing the most
common strategy class over benefit b and selection pressure w for connectivity k = 4, 8 and 12.B: Parameter scans showing
the most common strategy class over selection pressure w and connectivity k for benefit b = 2k. C: Strategy class proportion
and the boundary probability of linked agents sharing the same strategy over the number of neighbours k for benefit b = 2k
and selection pressure w = 1. Essentially the same as figure 4 in the main text, but with different topologies.
5SUPPLEMENT B: LATTICE NEIGHBOURHOODS
In figure 4 in the main text, we have presented results based on systems where agents are distributed on lattices with
varying neighbourhood sizes. While there are standard neighbourhoods of size 4, 6, 8, and 12 it is more ambiguous
how to design a lattice where all agents have for example an odd number of neighbours. Here we present a visualisation
of which neighbourhoods we have used in our simulations. The choices are not unique, but we see no reason to believe
that small variations should have a qualitative impact on the results.
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FIG. B1. Neighbourhood(blue) of an agent(green) on a squared lattice with connectivity n. Row(R) and Column(C)
6SUPPLEMENT C: NEIGHBOURS HAVE SIMILAR STRATEGIES
Figure 5 in the main text illustrates that neighbours are more likely to have similar strategies, where the ‘similarity’
between two strategies is measured by the number of labels towards which they agree on what action to take. The
parameters in the example were chosen such that all the different discriminating strategies are approximately equally
abundant. Here we show a handful of other examples, to demonstrate that the phenomenon is consistent for a large
variety of parameters, but that it breaks down when the selection pressure is very low. In addition we have included
a table with the numbers used to draw the graphs.
10 2 10 1 100w
0
2
4
6
8
10
b
B C
A
D
E
C(none)
C(1)
C(2)
C(all)
C(r)
C(r,g)
C(g)
C(g,b)
C(b)
C(r,b)
b = 4.0, w = 0.01
A)
C(r)
C(r,g)
C(g)
C(g,b)
C(b)
C(r,b)
b = 8.0, w = 0.2
B) C(r)
C(r,g)
C(g)
C(g,b)
C(b)
C(r,b)
b = 8.0, w = 1.0
C)
C(r)
C(r,g)
C(g)
C(g,b)
C(b)
C(r,b)
b = 4.1, w = 0.1
D) C(r)
C(r,g)
C(g)
C(g,b)
C(b)
C(r,b)
b = 4.2, w = 0.1
E)
FIG. C1. Strategy distributions visualised by graphs. Each node represent a strategy and the area is proportional to the
fraction of agents following it. The thickness of a link between two nodes is proportional to the fraction of neighbour-pairs
with one agent following each of the represented strategies. Each graph is the average results of 100 simulations at different
parameters (b and w), as marked in the phase-diagram (upper left panel). All the graphs are produced in systems with: Agents
arranged in a 100 × 100-square lattice connected to their k = 4 nearest neighbours. The L = 3 different labels are chosen
randomly at the beginning of each simulation with an independent uniform distribution. Each simulation is initiated with all
agents following the ”defect all” strategy, and the fraction of strategies and neighbour-pairs are measured after 108 timesteps.
The mutation rate is µ = 0.001.
Data Fig. 5 A B C D E
link-type mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
C(1)− Ca(2) 358 22 241 49 242 31 359 21 306 100 333 71
C(1)− C(1) 188 33 253 100 26 11 515 41 108 69 50 42
C(2)− C(2) 176 31 216 98 279 52 105 17 43 36 116 71
C(1)− Cb(2) 130 21 254 67 39 14 232 21 34 24 39 24
TABLE C1. The graphs above are generated on the background of 100 individual simulations each. After each simulation we
count the occurrences of each of the four types of connections. The means and standard deviations each ensemble are presented
in this table.
